Questioning Development as Freedom & its Relation to Dependency Theory and Democracy

While the notion of development as freedom seems almost intuitive to me on one level, I am still left wondering about this notion’s relationship to the Neo-Marxist implications of dependency theory. This relates back to my question about whether cutting off trade completely, isolating a nation, is a plausible option, which is obviously impossible and idealistic as I should have noted , but also brings about the paradox of cultural influence (the paradox being that it can be either positive or negative). Thinking back to the Rodney reading, where he decribes capitalism as inevitably exploiting other nations, I wonder if capitalist culture can also have instated ideas of corruption into those affected nations (I know this probably sounds like extreme socialist propaganda, and it probably is, but keep reading). In DER Chapter 3, Amartya Sen quite optimistically agrees with Yi Jing’s conclusion that “each country has to learn something from the other.” (40) Sen is a specialist in the relations between China and India, and shows us how China has been an economic role model for India, and that the Buddhist movement between them shows (at least for India) humanitarian interest (which, Mahbub Ul Haq says, is a developmental concept that need not be understated since for so long have we – or at least the Marxists – thought of development as something above the real people involved). Sen says that democracy makes sure that the people’s interests are accounted for, rather than brushed over or hidden by a powerful totalitarian government like that of China. He uses the examples of famines and epidemics to show that though China may have a longer life-expectancy, and is growing economically faster, “the persistent reporting of the dreadful state of Indian health services is, ultimately, a source of India’s dynamic strength.” (39) Perhaps slow and steady wins the race?

Still, like the Sachs article demonstrates, India is not “underdeveloped” per se, since Malawi and Bangladesh are comparatively less-developed. I don’t think that we can yet conclude that what worked in India will work with other countries. (I promise the isolationism theory comes in very soon!) In China, there is a severe sense of nationalism. I remember reading an article in The New Yorker many months ago in which they had interviewed a revolutionary writer, Han Han, who the internet police is always trying to censor, and who often makes a joke out of it. He described an article that he had read in the newspaper, which described a man’s 48-hour journey standing upright in a bus with no stops to get to his job which was non-stop (I can’t remember if he even had a place to sleep at night, or permission to), which lasted for about a month. The man then returned home on the same 48-hour bus (with no rest or bathroom breaks). Doesn’t this sound exactly like page 11 of the Sachs reading? Which describes Bangladesh? Anyway, Han Han was shocked (or perhaps not, because happenings like that are so commonplace in China) to find that the tone of this article was not disgust in the government, but pride in the man’s love of his country and his perseverance. But to Han Han, this poor man was not at all dignified – this extreme poverty had stripped away all dignity from him. The man had had to buy adult diapers just to make the trip. Oh, and his pay was much less than minimum, but that, of course, is not the issue here. This lines up with Sen’s argument that, freedom-wise, China is actually less-developed than India.

I think one thing that goes unmentioned (perhaps because it should be deemed as obvious) is India’s traditionalist culture of the caste system and arranged marriages. There is also the problem of viewing women as goods, and therefore not wanting daughters, but wanting sons (sounds like Mulan…). While many consider these traditions outdated, they are still very prevalent, and can’t be wiped out in only one or two generations. My mom, who is originally from Chile, but moved to the US when she was around 12 years old, used to tell me that, in Chile, a son of a baker, even if he becomes a lawyer, is still a son of a baker. Perhaps Chile (the so-called first developed South American country) has changed since then, but perhaps there is still an underlying tone of classism. What I am trying to get at is that China and India have an extremely strong sense of culture. I have this viewpoint because I am a mixed-up American, who feels as if she has very little cultural boundaries/ideals to adhere to (which leads to a lot of existential angst), but that is only what leads my questions. Historically, how much did China and India influence each other? They must have developed by themselves before interacting with each other, or else they wouldn’t have such different cultures. I realize that once a country has interacted with another country, you can’t reverse that knowledge that someone else is out there, but can we definitively say that freedom is a good thing when perhaps freedom is just a moral ideology that we, as Americans (or perhaps something else), are enthralled with? Perhaps this is wandering too far out of historical analysis, and into philosophical realms…

My point is that I still feel as though by pressuring countries to follow our path of “freedom” can still be a form of dependency because we are trying to change their culture to be more like our own culture. I feel as if we are still trying to decide what is the best type of government, or the best type of ideology to run a nation/community. Perhaps I am focusing too much on the word “freedom,” rather than on the meaning of it. When we, like Mahbub Ul Haq, say that “the basic purpose of development is to enlarge people’s choices,” (29) that is what we mean by freedom. It does not mean that Indians need to stop arranging marriages, just that they have the option of having an arranged marriage or choosing their own partner. I suppose strong, traditional culture doesn’t always die when a different, more innovative and open culture is introduced… Then again, in democracy, majority rules, and if that traditionalist culture falls into the minority, it can always be destroyed. But then, perhaps, they could create their own party, and then there would be peace again.

This blog post was just an extended argument with myself. If anyone has any responses, I really need them, because now the concept of “majority rules” is bothering me. I just don’t think traditionalist cultures should necessarily die out, but it seems so inevitable in this system of freedom being development.

Amartya Sen is absolutely right in saying "Freedoms are not only the primary ends of development, they are also among its principal means" (10), referring to the circular process in which the academic, social, economic, and sexual freedom of a nation's citizens enables them to contribute to the development of their society. However, Sen does not necessarily address whether or not it is absolutely necessary for a society to be relatively free in order to advance, so that is my question. Perhaps it is possible for a hypothetical country under communist rule, whose primary purpose is the production of exported goods, to be successful economically and to have happy citizens. However, would a lack of freedom to create and innovate be detrimental to that societies overall progression? If they continually purchased emerging technologies from other nations and kept up their high production and export rates, would they be able to develop in any sense of the word?

Development as Freedom

Sen's argument raises two immediate questions: first, if development is defined as the freedom of the average citizen, to what extent can there be a limit to this freedom and therefore to growth? Particularly in regards to Oliver Wendell Holmes' traditional argument in this country, we can see that ideal society is not completely free: in fact, a restriction on liberty can serve to protect citizens. The controversy inherent in this claim yields a much more complicated measurement of development, and more importantly for this course, of underdevelopment. Is a country with less political freedom than the United States by definition a less developed society, or are there distinct advantages inherent in a nation whose government is uninhibited by challenge from the population? Sen even cites Adam Smith's free market (p. 6) as justification for his argument, yet no modern capitalist society has as limited a role of government as outlined in "Duties of the Sovereign" in Wealth of Nations, suggesting the downsides of unrestricted freedom. And even in this topic, there is intense debate. The definition of ideal freedom in institutions as specific of the marketplace become considerably more important the interconnected nature of liberty in a society. when one considers Measuring development by GDP has the distinct advantage of being not only universally applicable (across the globe, a higher GDP is better) but also can keep rising infinitely. The second question is rooted in Sen's second rationale for development on freedom as outlined on page 4, "The effectiveness reason: achievement of development is thoroughly dependent on the free agency of people." What about the impact of foreign aid in development? As Sen puts it, "the free and sustainable agency emerges as a major engine of development." At the same time, we have seen from past readings that the role of West, for instance, on the growth of underdeveloped countries is integral to development. At what point must the "engine" of Europe and the U.S. switch over to that of the people of a country? The freedom to education or proper health care, key constituent components of development for Sen, can be fostered by the West, as demonstrated in countless examples of NGO's across the globe. This turning point is a critical question for designing development models.

The role of wealth in freedom is equally interesting. I was intrigued by Sen's analysis of the extent to which our material wealth can enable and foster other freedoms, particularly his statement that the relationship is neither exclusive or uniform (14). I found this issue particularly interesting because of the connection to this country: our economic situations directly impact our ability to educate our children or take care of our health. How does our definition of underdevelopment change when we consider this link?

ul Haq raises the interesting point of the top-down nature of economic growth and the focus on the rulers of a nation versus the individual. I was interested in the question of choices as it relates to this idea: as ul Haq says on 29, development is the "enlargement of choices." Is this enlargement more dependent on the will of the individual or the society? Which of these has a bigger influence on the range of choices and the ability of the citizen to access these choices? The emphasis he places on the role of the people in his proposed development paradigm shift reflects that ul Haq favors the individual, yet I am not as convinced.

Measuring development

It seemed to me that only in “Perspectives on the Economic Development of India and China” do we get a clear sense of the methods by which human development (as ul Haq calls it) or the expansion of human freedom are to be measured. In the other two readings, I got the general idea of the development as freedom approach: economic growth isn’t everything, because the way money is distributed and the ways in which people are able to constructively participate in society are also important when we are considering how developed a given country is. But those readings didn’t really pinpoint a way to compare countries or societies based on their levels of development. For instance, it’s hard to definitively call a country that has a growth rate of five percent per year and an authoritarian government more or less developed than a country with a two percent growth rate and a multi-party democracy. It’s very difficult for us to choose between economic freedom and political freedom, because, as both authors explain, they’re both essential to human freedom, broadly construed.

Sen, however, offers us metrics like infant mortality and life expectancy as convenient ways to roughly determine a country’s relative level of development. These statistics work especially well because they aren’t determined solely by any one aspect of a country’s development: “ … economic growth does contribute to the enhancing of living conditions, including longevity. However, … other factors, such as public policy of health care and educational expansion, can also make a radical difference” (Sen, “Perspectives,” 38). With basic measures like these, we can begin to get a feeling for the way social, economic, political, and cultural factors are combining within a given country to produce real results for people.

But then we run into another problem, because both Sen and ul Haq stress the fact that political and social freedoms are not only valuable because they produce better health or more equality—they’re valuable in what Sen calls a “constitutive” sense, which is to say that these kinds of freedoms are essential in an absolute, moral, philosophical way to human development. Economic growth, however, seems to have a relative importance, since it is said to be valuable only to the extent that it can enhance other freedoms. That is to say, if we can produce better health results through effective public health programs while having a one percent annual growth rate, the economic growth isn’t nearly as important as the overall health of the people. Only if the growth allowed overall health to improve, which it often does, would it be considered important. So, it seems, political and social freedoms are in fact more important to these authors than economic growth.